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Security of the three-party quantum secret sharing (QSS) schemes based on entanglement and a
collective eavesdropping check is analyzed in the case of considerable quantum channel losses. An
opaque attack scheme is presented for the dishonest agent to eavesdrop the message obtained by the
other agent freely, which reveals that these QSS schemes are insecure for transmission efficiencies
lower than 50%, especially when they are used to share an unknown quantum state. Finally, we
present a general way to improve the security of QSS schemes for sharing not only a private key but
also an unknown quantum state.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk, 03.67.-a
In a secret sharing [1], a sender, say Alice, has two
agents, Bob and Charlie who are at remote places. Alice
hopes that the agents can carry out her instruction (the
message MA), but she suspects that one of them (not
more than one) may be dishonest and the dishonest one
will do harm to her belongings if he can deal with it
independently. Moreover, Alice does not know who the
dishonest one is. For the security of the secret message
MA, Alice splits it into two pieces, MB and MC , and
then sends them to Bob and Charlie, respectively. The
two agents can read out the message MA =MB ⊕MC if
and only if they cooperate, otherwise none can obtain a
useful information. Quantum secret sharing (QSS) is the
generalization of classical secret sharing into quantum
scenario and has progressed quickly in recent years. It
provides a secure way for sharing not only a classical
information [2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11] but also a
quantum information [2, 3, 12, 13, 14, 15]. In the latter,
the sender Alice will send an unknown quantum state to
her agents, and one of them can recover it with the help
of the other [12, 13, 14, 15]. Now, QSS has also been
studied in experiment [16, 17, 18, 19]. In general, QSS is
far more complex than quantum key distribution (QKD)
[20] as the dishonest agent, a powerful eavesdropper, has
a chance to hide his eavesdropping by cheating the others.
Almost all the QSS schemes existing can be attributed
to one of the two types, the collective eavesdropping-
check one and the individual eavesdropping-check one.
The feature of the QSS schemes based on a collective
eavesdropping check is that the procedure of the eaves-
dropping check can be completed only when the sender
Alice gets the cooperation of the dishonest agent. That
is, Alice should require him to publish his outcomes of
the measurements on the samples chosen randomly for
checking eavesdropping. Otherwise, she and the honest
agent cannot accomplish the task. The typical models are
those in the Refs. [2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 14, 15]. In contrast,
in the individual eavesdropping-check QSS schemes, the
eavesdropping check between Alice and the honest agent
does not resort to the information published by the dis-
honest one. In other words, Alice and the honest agent
can analyze the error rate of their samples independent of
the dishonest one, and determine whether the quantum
channel between them is secure or not. Typical such QSS
schemes are the ones presented in Refs. [9, 10, 11, 12, 13].
There is a class of one-way QSS schemes whose security
is based on entanglement and a collective eavesdropping
check (ECEC), called them one-way ECEC QSS, such as
those in Refs. [2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19],
including the Hillery-Buzˇek-Berthiaume (HBB) scheme
[3] and the Karlsson-Koashi-Imoto (KKI) scheme [2],
and the experimental demonstrations for sharing a clas-
sical message [17, 18, 19] or a qubit [16]. Although
there are differences among particular schemes, almost
all of them realized the following scenario. First, the
sender Alice prepares two photons in an entangled state
|ξ±〉BC = 1√2 (|α〉B |β〉C ± |α¯〉B |β¯〉C), and sends the pho-
ton B to Bob and the photon C to Charlie (here |α〉
and |α¯〉 are the two eigenvectors of a two-level quantum
system, so do |β〉 and |β¯〉). Secondly, Bob and Char-
lie choose at least two nonorthogonal measuring bases
(MBs) to measure their photons independently. Thirdly,
Alice tells Bob and Charlie which photons are chosen
as the samples for checking eavesdropping, and then the
three participants analyze the error rate of the samples
collectively for determining whether the quantum chan-
nel is secure or not. Finally, if Alice deems that the
quantum channel is secure, she and her agents distill a
private key from the outcomes for which Bob and Charlie
choose two correlated MBs. Let us emphasize here two
properties of the one-way ECEC QSS. First, the quan-
tum systems are sent from Alice to her agents in one
way. Second, its test eavesdropping procedure depends
on the entanglement correlation of the quantum systems
and the information published by all the participants.
As the security of a QSS scheme is based on the public
statistical analysis of the error rate of the samples chosen
randomly by the three participants including the poten-
2tially dishonest agent, it must be guaranteed against the
dishonest agent with unlimited computing power whose
technology is limited only by the laws of quantum me-
chanics [21]. Without loss of generality, we assume that
the dishonest agent is Bob. The aim of this paper is
to present an opaque attack scheme for Bob to obtain
Alice’s message (a classical one or a quantum one) with-
out the cooperation of the other agent Charlie, provided
that quantum channel losses are high enough. The su-
periority of Bob over current technology is restricted to
the possibility of near lossless photon transmission, the
storage of quantum states, and the capability of prepar-
ing and manipulating two-photon Bell state. Same as
Ref. [22], our scheme considers the opportunity of eaves-
dropping arising due to a separation of two procedures,
namely, the eavesdropping-check procedure and the mes-
sage sharing procedure (including the one for sharing an
unknown quantum state).
Now, let us elaborate the principle of the one-way
ECEC QSS with the example of the KKI scheme [2]. Al-
ice encodes a randomly binary bit string S, selecting for
instance two sets of states {|ψ+〉, |φ−〉} ⇔ {|0〉, |1〉} and
{|Ψ+〉, |Φ−〉} ⇔ {|0′〉, |1′〉} which are defined as follows.
|ψ+〉BC = 1√
2
(|+ z〉B| − z〉C + | − z〉B|+ z〉C), (1)
|φ−〉BC = 1√
2
(|+ z〉B|+ z〉C − | − z〉B| − z〉C), (2)
|Ψ+〉BC = 1√
2
(|+ z〉B|+ x〉C + | − z〉B| − x〉C), (3)
|Φ−〉BC = 1√
2
(|+ z〉B| − x〉C − | − z〉B|+ x〉C), (4)
where the subscripts B and C represent the two photons
in an entangled state, and |± z〉 and |±x〉 are the eigen-
states of the z-spin (basis Z) and the x-spin (basis X),
respectively,
| ± x〉 = 1√
2
(|+ z〉 ± | − z〉). (5)
The KKI QSS scheme works with three steps below.
(1) Alice prepares two photons randomly in one of the
four states {|ψ+〉, |φ−〉, |Ψ+〉, |Φ−〉}, and sends the pho-
ton B to Bob and the photon C to Charlie. The two
agents Bob and Charlie locally measure their photons
with the two bases Z and X randomly. They repeat this
procedure for obtaining an enough large set of outcomes
Sa for distilling their private key KA = KB ⊕KC . Here
KA, KB and KC are the keys kept by Alice, Bob and
Charlie in secret sharing, respectively.
(2) Bob and Charlie declare a set of outcomes for a test
of eavesdropping first and then the measurement bases
for all the outcomes Sa. As claimed by the authors in
KKI QSS scheme [2], this order is very important for
testing eavesdropping. Even they invented a refined or-
der for their QSS scheme. That is, for the test bits, say
Ss, the person who declared the outcome first should be
the last to declare the basis.
(3) After the information about the outcomes and the
bases for the test bits have been released, Alice tells Bob
and Charlie which of two bases the state was sent, but
not which state. For completing the error rate analysis
of the test bits, Alice publishes which states were sent
for them. In this way, half of the outcomes Sa are useful
as Bob and Charlie choose such two correlated bases for
their measurements that they can deduce the states sent
by Alice after she announces her bases, and the other
outcomes will be discarded.
In essence, the KKI scheme [2] is a typical model for
the one-way ECEC QSS. The HBB scheme [3] is equiva-
lent to the KKI scheme if the three participants exploit
the refined order to declare the information for the test
bits although the quantum information carriers are three-
particle Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger states.
|G〉 = 1
2
[|+ x〉A(|+ x〉B |+ x〉C + | − x〉B | − x〉C)
+| − x〉A(|+ x〉B | − x〉C + | − x〉B |+ x〉C)
=
1
2
[|+ y〉A(|+ x〉B | − y〉C + | − x〉B|+ y〉C)
+| − y〉A(|+ x〉B |+ y〉C + | − x〉B| − y〉C),(6)
where |± y〉 = 1√
2
(|+ z〉± i|− z〉). When Alice measures
her photon A with the basis X , the two photons B and C
are in one of the two states {|ψ′+〉, |φ′−〉}; otherwise they
are in one of the two states {|Ψ′+〉, |Φ′−〉} if the basis Y
is chosen by Alice. Here the two bases of an entangled
photon pair BC are defined as
|ψ′+〉 ≡ 1√
2
(|+ x〉B | − x〉C + | − x〉B |+ x〉C), (7)
|φ′−〉 ≡ 1√
2
(|+ x〉B |+ x〉C + | − x〉B | − x〉C), (8)
|Ψ′+〉 ≡ 1√
2
(|+ x〉B |+ y〉C + | − x〉B| − y〉C), (9)
|Φ′−〉 ≡ 1√
2
(|+ x〉B | − y〉C + | − x〉B|+ y〉C). (10)
It is obvious that these two bases can be transformed
into each other by the transformations |−x〉C ↔ |+ y〉C
and | + x〉C ↔ | − y〉C , as same as the KKI scheme [2]
in which | − z〉C ↔ |+ x〉C and |+ z〉C ↔ | − x〉C . It is
not difficult to prove that the other one-way ECEC QSS
schemes [4, 5, 6] are equivalent to the KKI scheme with
or without a little of modification.
Our opaque attack scheme on the KKI scheme includes
two procedures, the one for checking eavesdropping and
the one for generating a private key (or for sharing quan-
tum information). Let us first describe the attack on
eavesdropping check. It includes the following two steps.
(a) The dishonest agent Bob first intercepts the pho-
ton C sent from Alice to Charlie, and replaces it with
a fake photon C′ which is one particle in the Bell state
|φ+〉B′C′ = 1√2 (| + z〉B′ | + z〉C′ + | − z〉B′ | − z〉C′) pre-
pared by Bob himself. Moreover, he uses a near lossless
3quantum channel to receive the photons B and C sent
from Alice, and stores them with a quantum memory.
(b) When and only when Bob gets the information that
the photon B is chosen as the sample for detecting eaves-
dropping, he performs a Bell-state measurement on the
photons C and B′. If he obtains the result |φ+〉B′C =
1√
2
(|+ z〉B′ |+ z〉C + | − z〉B′ | − z〉C), Bob measures the
photon B with the basis Z or the basis X , the same as
that in the original KKI scheme, and announces the out-
come of the single-photon measurement. If Bob gets the
result |ψ−〉B′C = 1√2 (| + z〉B′ | − z〉C − | − z〉B′ | + z〉C),
he first takes the operation iσy = |+ z〉〈−z| − | − z〉〈+z|
on the photon B and then manipulates it as same as the
case with the result |φ+〉B′C . If he gets the other two Bell
states |φ−〉B′C = 1√2 (|+z〉B′ |+z〉C−|−z〉B′ |−z〉C) and
|ψ+〉B′C = 1√2 (| + z〉B′ | − z〉C + | − z〉B′ | + z〉C), he de-
clares he did not receive that particular bit. As he knows
the fact that his eavesdropping will introduce errors in
the outcomes when Bob obtains |φ−〉B′C or |ψ+〉B′C , his
cheating will erase the errors in the test bits. Of course,
Bob’s cheating will in principle induce 50% losses of the
outcomes in an ideal condition.
Suppose that the honest agent Charlie obtains the out-
come |RC′〉 = a| + z〉 + b| − z〉 when he measures the
photon C′ with the basis Z or X . The photon B′ will
collapse to the state |RB′〉 = |RC′〉 as well. After the
Bell-state measurement was done by Bob on the photons
B′C and the result |φ+〉B′C was obtained, the photon B
will collapse to the the states (without being normalized)
a|+z〉−b|−z〉, a|−z〉+b|+z〉, (a−b)|+z〉−(a+b)|+z〉, and
(a+b)|+z〉+(a−b)|−z〉when the entangled photon pair
BC is prepared by Alice in the states |φ−〉BC , |ψ+〉BC ,
|Φ−〉BC , and |Ψ+〉BC , respectively. Table I shows the
states obtained by the three participants when Bob uses
our opaque attack scheme and obtains the result |φ+〉B′C .
Alice’s states are given in the columns and Charlie’s out-
comes are given in the rows. Bob’s states before he mea-
sures the photon B with a correlated basis appear in the
boxes. They are the same as those in the original KKI
QSS scheme. The difference between the results |φ+〉B′C
and |ψ−〉B′C is just the unitary operation iσy. That is
to say, Bob’s attack will introduce no error in the test
bits for detecting eavesdropping if he obtains the result
|φ+〉B′C or |ψ−〉B′C no matter what the state of the orig-
inal two photons B and C prepared by Alice is and the
bases chosen by the two agents for their photons. If he
gets the other two Bell states, which takes place with
the probability 50%, he will introduce about 50% error
rate in the test bits, but he can hide these errors with
cheating. That is, for these outcomes, he tells Alice and
Charlie that he gets nothing when he measures the pho-
ton B because of the quantum channel losses. So Alice
and Charlie cannot detect this eavesdropping if the losses
aroused by the quantum channel is more than 50% no
matter what the order of the information published do
the three participants choose, not the case claimed in the
original KKI QSS scheme.
TABLE I: The states obtained by the three participants Alice,
Charlie and Bob.
Alice
|φ−〉 |ψ+〉 |Φ−〉 |Ψ+〉
|+ z〉 |+ z〉 | − z〉 | − x〉 |+ x〉
Charlie | − z〉 | − z〉 |+ z〉 |+ x〉 | − x〉
|+ x〉 | − x〉 |+ x〉 | − z〉 |+ z〉
| − x〉 |+ x〉 | − x〉 |+ z〉 | − z〉
For the other instances used for creating a private key
(not for checking eavesdropping), Bob need only perform
a Bell-state measurement on the two photons B and C
after Alice announces their basis, and then he can get
all the information about Alice’s key KA. On the other
hand, in the period of declaring bases for the key bits,
Bob can announce a fake information about the sequence
of the bases Z and X, and then measure the photon B′
with the same basis as chosen by Charlie and obtain the
key KC after Charlie publishes her bases for the out-
comes. In this way, the eavesdropping done by Bob can-
not be detected.
So far, we have presented our opaque attack scheme
for the dishonest agent to eavesdrop the one-way ECEC
QSS fully and freely with the typical model, the KKI QSS
scheme [2]. This attack scheme works for other one-way
ECEC QSS schemes [3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19],
including those for sharing an unknown quantum state
[2, 3, 14, 15, 16], with or without a little of modifica-
tion as Bob only measures the photons used for the test
bits, not for message before he gets all other information
published by Alice and Charlie. Bob does not introduce
errors in the test bits but only produces losses. The losses
induced by Bob can be, however, hidden in the channel
losses. Same as Ref. [22], let us suppose that Alice and
her agents use an original quantum channel with a to-
tal transmission efficiency η not exceeding 50%. Typical
values of η for long-distance experimental quantum com-
munication well fit this range [22, 23]. For eavesdropping,
Bob replaces the original quantum channel by a better
one with the transmission efficiency η′. The probability
Pe that Bob can eavesdrop the one-way ECEC QSS freely
with this opaque cheating attack scheme is Pe =
2(η′−η)
η′
when η′ < 2η; otherwise, Pe = 100%. In order to keep
the transmission efficiency η between Alice and Charlie,
Bob should filter out (1−η)×100% of the fake photon C′
reaching Charlie. In this way the information about the
eavesdropping is completely erased from the outcomes
obtained by Charlie in the detecting eavesdropping pro-
cedure and the message sharing procedure. This means
that Bob can eavesdrop fully and freely the information
in the one-way ECEC QSS if he replaces the original
quantum channel with a better quantum channel whose
total transmission efficiency is double of that of original
one and controls the balance of transmission efficiencies.
Let us now consider how to improve the one-way ECEC
QSS to make it secure. Its insecurity over a lossy quan-
4tum channel in principle arises from two factors. One is
that the dishonest agent Bob always controls a photon
which is entangled with the other one received by the
honest agent before the participants do their eavesdrop-
ping check. The other one is that the test eavesdropping
procedure is a collective one, i.e., dependent on the infor-
mation published by the dishonest agent. The first fac-
tor gives Bob the chance that he can obtain a correlated
outcome with a certain probability in the eavesdropping
check procedure and also get correctly all the information
obtained by all the participants subsequently (especially
in the case for sharing an unknown quantum state). The
second factor provides Bob the tools to erase the errors
produced by his attack in the test eavesdropping proce-
dure. For improving the security of one-way ECEC QSS,
the boss Alice can disentangle the two photons sent from
her to her two agents for the outcomes in the test bits.
In this way, the eavesdropping check procedures between
Alice and Bob, and Alice and Charlie are as same as the
Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) QKD scheme [24] which
is proven secure for generating a private key [25]. We
should confess that the modified one-way ECEC QSS for
sharing a private key, to some extent, is not better than
two BB84 QKD processes as the latter provides a simple
way for three participants to share a private key effi-
ciently without resorting to entanglement at the expense
of exchanging a little more classical information. As for
the one-way ECEC QSS for sharing an unknown quan-
tum state, the two photons prepared by the boss Alice
and sent to her two agents for checking eavesdropping
should be in a product state.
In conclusion, we have presented an undetectable
opaque cheat attack scheme for the dishonest agent in
one-way ECEC QSS to eavesdrop the outcomes obtained
by the other agent. This scheme works on the realis-
tic implementation of one-way ECEC QSS if the quan-
tum channel losses cannot be ignored. The dishonest
agent first intercepts the photons sent from the sender
and stores them. He sends the other agent a fake pho-
ton in a Bell state and exploits the quantum losses to
hide his action when the fake photon is chosen for de-
tecting eavesdropping. As he can control the efficiency
of transmission, he can eavesdrop the QSS freely. Obvi-
ously, this attack is efficient in the case there are more
than two agents in a QSS scheme with a little modifica-
tion as well. We also suggest a general way for improving
the security of one-way ECEC QSS. It works especially
when the QSS schemes are used to share an unknown
quantum state.
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Note added- The anonymous referee thinks that
there is no security loophole in one-way ECEC QSS
schemes if a standard key sifting procedure, in which
the events where no photon was detected are removed
before the participants perform the common eavesdrop-
ping check, is performed. This is true when the QSS
schemes are used for sharing a classical information be-
cause all the participants measured all the particles in-
cluding those used for distilling a private key, which will
give no chance for the dishonest agent to get the out-
comes obtained by the other agent perfectly. However,
this way does not work when the QSS schemes are used
for sharing an unknown quantum state as the dishon-
est agent need not measure the particles for sharing the
unknown quantum state (he need only measure the parti-
cles used for checking eavesdropping), which means that
they are insecure in this time even though the partici-
pants exploit a standard key sifting procedure to check
eavesdropping.
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